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THE CURIOUS CRYPTO QUESTION: DO PATENTS
ADVANCE FINTECH INNOVATION? THE PARADOX
ARISING FROM FIVE KEY RECENT TRENDS
By Chris J. Katopis1
The Author examines some recent trends in intellectual property
(U.S. patents) in the fintech sector, summarizes this empirical data,
and discusses the potential implications of these developments.
“As new technologies emerge and the financial services
industry puts those technologies to use, Congress must make
sure that responsible innovation is encouraged, and that
regulators and the law are adapting to the changing
landscape to best protect consumers, investors and small
businesses.” 2
The Hon. Maxine Waters
(D-CA), chair of the U.S.
House of Representatives
Committee on Financial
Service

1
The author is of Counsel at Franklin, Scott, Conway LLP. He recently served
as a Senior Legal Advisor at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. He has
previously served in other governmental roles, including as law clerk to the
Hon. Pauline Newman, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and as
counsel to the U.S. House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet,
and Intellectual Property. B.S., 1990, University of Pennsylvania, School of
Engineering and Applied Sciences; J.D., 1994, Temple University Law
School. The views and opinions expressed within this article should be
attributed to the author, rather than to any client, agency, or other entity.
2
Press Release, U.S. House Committee on Financial Services, Waters
Announces Committee Task Forces on Financial Technology and Artificial
Intelligence
(May
9,
2019),
https://financialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID
=403738; see also Douglas Clark, House committee task forces on Fintech,
AI
established,
FIN.
REG.
NEWS
(May
14,
2019),
https://financialregnews.com/house-committee-task-forces-on-fintech-aiestablished/.
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INTRODUCTION
The revolution in financial services technology (“fintech”) is
driven by many factors, including technological innovation,
government regulation, and stakeholder demand. This fintech
revolution promises to be disruptive, innovative, beneficial, and
potentially messy. The many voices in the fintech debate range from
congressional policymakers to state and federal regulators, from
standard-setting organizations and marketplace entities to the end
consumers. As the fintech revolution rages on, patents are likely to play
an increasingly significant role, if not a material factor. First, this
article relies on empirical data to examine some recent legal trends
related to patent activity that may explain whether patents materially
advance fintech innovation. Second, the article assesses the impact of
patent-related activity to determine whether it has a net positive or
negative influence. For many industry stakeholders, if the first question
is whether fintech is the next big thing, then the next question is
whether related patent litigation is the next, next big thing.
This article considers several recent important developments,
federal public policy initiatives, and empirical data to analyze patents’
role as a potential driver of fintech innovation. Washington, D.C., is
the center of gravity for these matters, given the U.S. Constitution’s
governance, the current operative legislative frameworks, and the
regulatory agency review. Appropriately, Congresswoman Maxine
Waters (D-CA), chair of the House Financial Services Committee, is
among the many lawmakers asking the question, “How do we get more
innovation from the financial services industry?”3
Patents, which are rooted in the U.S. Constitution,4 are a form
of legal protection for inventions, rather than mere concepts or ideas,
such as scientific principles or the concept of basic human economic
interactions. The U.S. Congress enacted the first Patent Act in 1790.5
Patents are considered an indicator of innovation, as will be discussed
3

See generally Press Release, U.S. Committee on Financial Services, Waters
Outlines Agenda in First Policy Speech as Committee Chairwoman (Jan. 16,
2019),
https://financialservices.house.gov/news/email/show.aspx?ID=LSOOG4ZW
MHVGE (“[I]t is important that we encourage responsible innovation with
the appropriate safeguards in place to protect consumers and without
displacing community banks and credit unions.”).
4
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).
5
See The Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109.
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in further detail below. Recent empirical evidence shows a dramatic
increase in patent-related activity surrounding fintech, including new
worldwide fintech patent applications and government grants of these
patent rights.6 This evidence suggests that patents play some role in
fintech innovation and investment, if not an indicator of this activity.
Although, the full extent is unclear.
Patents remain a controversial form of legal protection, despite
a long history and tradition dating back to the writing of the U.S.
Constitution. Legal historians and economists often teach that the
modern patent system, rooted in the 18th century, has long played a
significant role in advancing various technological fields.7 Many in the
academic community argue that the essence of the patent system is
about balancing incentives and public benefits, such as the disclosure
of useful knowledge.8 The argument is often presented as follows:
The historical and philosophical underpinning of
intellectual property show that its purpose is to provide
a narrowly tailored, private monopoly privilege as an

6

See, e.g., European Patent Office, Talking About a New Revolution:
Blockchain,
(Dec.
4,
2018),
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/FB134B001751B1F
AC12583BD00317B47/$File/Talking_about_a_new_revolution_blockchain
_conference_report_en.pdf.
7
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 255–57, 435–
38 (2d ed. 1985) (“Monopoly was in bad odor in 1776, except for the special
case of the patent, which served as an incentive for technical innovation.”);
Abraham Lincoln, Second Lecture on Discoveries and Inventions, in THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 356, 363 (Roy P. Basler et al. eds.
1953) (explaining that patents are intended to add “the fuel of interest to the
fire of genius” by granting inventors exclusive rights in their inventions);
Robert P. Merges, The Hamiltonian Origins of the U.S. Patent System, and
Why They Matter Today, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2559 (2019) (“The patent system
was one of the earliest instruments of economic development put in place by
the young United States. It represents a distinctly pre-twentieth century
policy—one of the strands in the sturdy rope that pulled the early Republic
forward into prosperity.”)
8
Elliot C. Cook & Darren M. Jiron, Patents Are Business Tools for CyberTech
Companies, Not Trophies, HAARETZ CYBER MAG. (June 2016),
https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/articles/patents-are-business-toolsfor-cybertech-companies-not-trophies.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2021); Seth
Fiegerman, In Tech, Patents are Trophies – and These Companies are
Dominating,
CNN
(June
19,
2018),
https://money.cnn.com/2018/06/19/technology/tech-patents/index.html.
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incentive to produce various types of works for the
public good.9
The general proposition of the public-private bargain
embodied in the U.S. Constitution is that patents confer a limited
private benefit in exchange for sharing the fundamental knowledge of
the invention with the public.10 Patent advocates further argue that in
the absence of patent protection, the innovators would turn to trade
secret protection to secure their inventions providing sub-optimal
societal benefits, instead of the teaching of valuable technology
through public disclosure.11 Judge Pauline Newman of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit defined “technological innovation”
broadly as the process of “advancing the useful arts.”12 For Judge
Newman, patents are a vital tool and part of the constitutionally based
right that “carries the obligation to disclose the workings of the
invention . . . [that adds] to the store of knowledge without diminishing
the patent-supported incentive to innovate.”13
Some observers find it easy to accept the application of such
patent principles to Industrial Age inventions such as Edison’s
lightbulb or the Wright Brothers’ plane.14 In contrast, many modern
9

Chris J. Katopis, Patients v. Patients?: Policy Implications of Recent Patent
Legislation, 71 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 329, 332 (1997) (hereinafter Katopis,
Patients v. Patents).
10
See, e.g., id. at 332 (“The ‘storehouse theory’ states that the disclosure under
the patent system a first inventor contributes ‘a measure of worthwhile
knowledge’ so as to ‘enlarge[] the public storehouse of knowledge.’”).
11
Id. at 338; see also PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS
1–45 (2d ed. 1996) (explaining that under trade secret law, an inventor who
keeps his invention secret may enjoy de facto exclusivity and may rely on
state enforcement of nondisclosure agreements); Adam D. Moore, Intellectual
Property and the Prisoner’s Dilemma: A Game Theory Justification of
Copyrights, Patents, and Trade Secrets, 28 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 831, 849 (2018) (“If innovators would be motivated to create
independent of compensation and in spite of being able to recoup investment
costs, then copying would not lead to a suppression of content creation and a
sub-optimal outcome . . . [i]t should be obvious that such considerations
would inevitably lead content creators to deploy their efforts in less risky
pursuits.”).
12
Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
13
Id.
14
See generally U.S. Patent No. 223,898. (issued Jan. 27, 1880) (Edison’s
lightbulb (“Electric Lamp”)); U.S. Patent No. 821,393 (issued May 22, 1906)
(the Wright Brothers plane (“Flying-machine”)).
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critics argue the incentives of the traditional patent system are simply
out of date and incapable of meeting the needs of the fast-paced world
of technology, let alone the needs of the Fourth Industrial Revolution.15
This revolution promises cutting-edge advances such as, artificial
intelligence, the Internet of Things (IoT), and the fintech sector. Patent
advocates argue that patents can serve as a valuable asset class for all
industries when ventures raise capital and secure investment.
Innovation is an expensive proposition, especially for poorly
capitalized entrepreneurs and start-ups. In the fintech context, financial
industry experts estimate that the development of a new financial
product can range in cost from $50,000 to $5 million.16
History teaches us that patent protection on banking and
financial services-related inventions has a long pedigree and certainly
is a practical reality.17 The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
is among the sources that cite the long historical precedent of patents
for such inventions. The method of “Detecting Counterfeit Notes”
(1799) and “A Mode of Preventing Counterfeiting” (1815) are among
some of the earliest examples.18 These financial services-related “tech”
patents remain controversial more than a century later for various
reasons. Some critics question whether the legal protection normally
afforded to technology and the follow-on incentives are applicable in
the business world.19 It is a fundamental public policy and economic
question whether such protection is appropriate for the entire category
of financial related activity.20 The debate about affording patent
protection to other sectors of the economy has raged for decades.21
More than a century ago, the U.S. Congress observed:
No one has advanced a just and logical reason why
reward for service to the public should be extended to
15

Don Tiller, Comment, Devaluing Invention: The Push for Patent Reform,
14 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 119 (2007).
16
Peter Tufano, Financial Innovation and First-Mover Advantages, 25 J. OF
FIN. ECON. 213, 213–40 (1989).
17
See generally Michael Risch, America’s First Patents 64 FLORIDA L. REV.
1279 (2012); see Dickinson, infra note 76.
18
John Kneas, Text of Patent for White Paper on Business Methods Patents:
Bank
Note
Printing.,
U.S.
PAT.
TRADEMARK
OFF.,
https://web.archive.org/web/20061231223224/http://www.uspto.gov/web/m
enu/busmethp/x2301.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2021) (An archived copy of
the material can be found in December 2006).
19
Ricardo Bonilla, A Patented Lie: Analyzing the Worthiness of Business
Method Patents After Bilski v. Kappos, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1285 (2011).
20
Id.
21
Roman Perchyts, Business Method Patents: Let the Ptab Kill Them All? A
Case for Narrow Reading of CBM Review Eligibility, U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL’Y, Fall 2018, at 433.
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the inventor of a mechanical toy and denied to the
genius whose patience, foresight, and effort have given
a valuable new [discovery] to mankind.22
In truth, the global financial services industry appears to have
a love-hate relationship with patents. Critics of patents in financial
services fields, such as business method patents, argue that there are
numerous reasons not to afford them any such legal protection,
including the shifting legal standards around patentability; the
inevitably poor quality of patent claims; the expense of procuring
patents; the difficulty of enforcement; vexing, specious litigation; and,
a lack of consensus within the traditional banking regulatory regime.
The fintech community is clearly of two minds when it comes
to patents. The digital currency Bitcoin, for example, is considered
open source and unpatentable by design.23 In contrast, we have also
seen both traditional businesses and start-ups engaging in a virtual,
digital gold rush and chasing patent claims.24 At the time of this
Article’s 2021 publication, the USPTO has granted more than 2,100
patents expressly claiming “blockchain”-related inventions and more
than 100 expressly claiming “bitcoin.”25 In 2020, Square, Inc. made
22

Hearings on H.R. 11372 Before the House Comm. On Patents, 71st Cong.
3, at 2 (1930).
23
See Patent Pledge FAQ, BLOCKSTREAM’S DEFENSIVE PATENT STRATEGY,
https://blockstream.com/about/patent_faq/ (responding affirmatively to a
question whether “Bitcoin is both open-source and unpatentable. The original
ideas as published in the Bitcoin whitepaper were not patented. Inventors have
a year after making their inventions public to file patent applications, and then
the window is closed. Because of this, the basic Bitcoin system is free of
patent restrictions; it is too late for anyone to come forward and apply for new
patents on Bitcoin now. What can still be patented are the incremental
improvements, complementary technologies, or additional applications of the
technologies that are currently being developed.”).
24
Seth Cronin, The Blockchain Patent Gold Rush, IPCAPITAL GROUP BLOG
(Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.ipcg.com/the-blockchain-patent-gold-rush/ (last
visited Sept. 25, 2021) (“Much like the California Gold Rush of 1850s, the
enticing opportunity of blockchain’s potential to revolutionize global
financial (and many other) markets through transaction security has brought
a wave of prospectors to stake their claim on the blockchain patent
landscape.”).
25
Querying Results from Keyword Text Search of “Blockchain” and
“Bitcoin” within the Field of Patent Claims, U.S. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF. PAT.
FULL-TEXT
AND
IMAGE
DATABASE,
https://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-bool.html (last visited June 27,
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news when it was issued a significant patent covering a
“cryptocurrency payment network.”26 The company’s patent abstract
teaches that:
The present technology provides a payment service for
providing financial transactions between a customer
and merchant wherein the customer can pay in any
currency and the merchant can be paid in any currency.
Furthermore, the present technology supports payment
using cryptocurrency, while improving such
transactions in a way that takes advantage of benefits of
such transactions while overcoming drawbacks such as
delays in processing.27
As of the date of this article’s publication, Square, Inc. has
secured more than 600 U.S. patents across all fields of technology.28
In 2020, observers noted that many of the key crypto
industry players earned patents, including Bank of America, which was
the recipient of 36 new blockchain patents.29 Bank of America earned
U.S. Patent No. 10,643,202, entitled “Real-time processing distributed
ledger system.”30 Craig Wright’s nChain Holdings Limited also
recently earned four blockchain patents.31 A recent nChain patent, U.S.
Patent No. 10,579,779, is entitled “Method and system for verifying
integrity of a digital asset using a distributed hash table and a peer-topeer distributed ledger.”32
2021) (follow link to access USPTO Patent Database; then independently
input a quoted keyword of “Blockchain” or “Bitcoin” in the “Term 1” textbox;
then select the “Claim(s)” option within the “Field 1” dropdown menu; then
select the “Search” button; then repeat the process with the other quoted
keyword).
26
See generally U.S. Patent No. 10,540,639 (issued Jan. 21, 2020) (Invention
assigned to Square, Inc. (“Cryptocurrency payment network”)).
27
Id.
28
Querying Results from Keyword Text Search of “Square, Inc” within the
Field of Patent Assignee Name, U.S. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF. PAT. FULL-TEXT
AND
IMAGE DATABASE, https://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/searchbool.html (last visited July 16, 2021) (follow link to access USPTO Patent
Database; then input “Square, Inc” in the “Term 1” textbox; then select
“Assignee Name” option within the “Field 1” dropdown menu; then select the
“Search” button).
29
Thomas Isaacson, The Blockchain Patent Landscape Shows Accelerating
Growth,
IPWATCHDOG
(Dec.
4,
2020),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/12/04/the-blockchain-patent-landscapeshows-accelerating-growth/id=127922/.
30
See U.S. Patent No. 10,643,202-B2 (issued May 5, 2020).
31
Isaacson, supra note 29.
32
U.S. Patent No. 10,579,779 (issued March 3, 2020).
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Bank of America, nChain, and Square are in good company, as
a number of leading companies are obtaining patents on fintech
innovations, including blockchain. It is notable that Chinese
companies like Alibaba Group Holdings currently appear to be leading
the patent gold rush.33 The charts below illustrate some of these recent
activities by domestic and overseas entities seeking patents protection
in the U.S. and countries around the world.
Chart 1: Top Companies in Blockchain Patents34

33
Rocky Berndsen, Titans of Technology: Blockchain / The Top Companies
in Blockchain Patents 2021, HARRITY & HARRITY, https://harrityllp.com/topcompanies-in-blockchain-patents/ (active worldwide patents and pending
applications as of September 1, 2021).
34
Id.
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Chart 2: Blockchain Patents and Applications for Top 45 Filers35

The Article now identifies five major recent trends driving
events related to patents surrounding fintech and crypto innovation.
These trends span the past decade, but the last few years were
especially significant for a variety of reasons discussed below.
I.

TREND ONE: THE U.S. PATENT OFFICE CONTINUES TO GRANT
A RECORD NUMBER OF PATENTS ANNUALLY

The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is a federal
agency whose duties primarily involve the examination of patent
applications and the issuance of patents.36 The USPTO has been
labeled as a gatekeeper of technological innovation.37 The agency is
considered as one granting private property rights in an invention;
nevertheless, it can still be considered a federal regulator.38 The agency
is not an enforcement agency per se, inter alia, in that it does not make
determinations of patent infringement or award remedies such as
monetary damages.39 The agency is in the business of examining
35

Overview of the Patent Landscape in the Blockchain, Cryptocurrency, and
Cryptographic Token Space, WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI 5 (Oct.
12, 2018), https://www.wsgr.com/print/v2/content/5284/Overview-of-thePatent-Landscape-in-the-Blockchain%2C-Cryptocurrency%2C-andCryptographic-Token-Space.pdf.
36
See U.S. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/ (last visited Sept.
3, 2021).
37
See Chris J. Katopis, Perfect Happiness?: Game Theory As A Tool For
Enhancing Patent Quality, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 360, 365 (2008) (discussing
additional information on USPTO filing trends and its history) (hereinafter
Katopis, Perfect Happiness).
38
Ron A. Bouchard, Qualifying Intellectual property II: A New Innovation
Index for Pharmaceutical Patents & Products, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 287, 311 (2011).
39
Additionally, the USPTO has a division, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board
(PTAB), that regularly reviews previously granted U.S. patents that are likely
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domestic and foreign patent applications and issuing patents. The
patent business is booming. The USPTO’s records show that it
continues to issue a record number of patents overall and at an
accelerating pace.40 Importantly, and for the purposes of this article,
the USPTO is issuing a record number of patents at an accelerating
pace in the fintech sector, including blockchain and crypto
technologies. Frighteningly, any one of these issued patents may prove
to be an existential threat to one or more fintech companies. The rising
patent tide has truly lifted all boats, but a tsunami may be on the
horizon.
Readers should consider the historical trends concerning patent
activity. The U.S. patent system was established by Congress in
1790.41 In 1911, merely some 120 years later, the one-millionth U.S.
patent was issued to F.H. Houlton for the invention of a vehicle tire.42
A generation ago, the former chief judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, Howard T. Markey, observed that more than
1,000,000 patents were issued in the some twenty years between 1953
and 1971.43 Recently, in 2018, the ten millionth U.S. patent was
granted.44 Today, the USPTO is on track to issue one million patents
every three years (e.g., more than 300,000 patents annually).45 In sum,
the long arc of history confirms that the rate of patent grants, or

involved in a federal district court legal action. The PTAB will be discussed
later in the Article.
40
Table of Issue Years and Patent Numbers, for Selected Document Types
Issued
Since
1836,
U.S.
PAT.
TRADEMARK
OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/issuyear.htm (last visited
Sept. 3, 2021).
41
Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1970).
42
Technically, there were also additional patents previously issued in U.S.
history. The Patent Office lost a large number of its files and patent records
in an 1836 fire. Thereafter, the patent numbering system reset, and the Patent
Office once again started numbering its patents starting anew from number
one.
43
Howard T. Markey, The Status of the Patent System—“Sans Myth, Sans
Fiction”, 59 J.P.O.S. 164 (1977).
44
See Patents Through History, U.S. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF.,
https://10millionpatents.uspto.gov (last visited July 16, 2021); see also
Katopis, Perfect Happiness, supra note 37.
45
FY 2020 Performance and Accountability Report, U.S. PAT. TRADEMARK
OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTOFY20PAR.pdf
(hereinafter Annual Reports).
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issuance continues to accelerate over time, as illustrated by the
following chart.
Chart 3: Milestones in U.S. Patenting46

47

The table below summarizes this past decade’s patent activity,
including the total number of U.S. patents, total patents, blockchain
patents, bitcoin patents, and worldwide blockchain applications. While
this is based on publicly available data sources, it should not be
48

46

Milestones in U.S. patenting, U.S. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/patents/milestones (last visited Sept. 28, 2021) (This
increased volume and pace is driven by an ever-increasing number of overseas
patent applications from overseas.).
47
Milestones in U.S. Patenting, U.S. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/patents/milestones (last visited Aug. 1, 2021).
48
Table 1 is based on the following sources: (1) the numbers of the “Recent
USPTO Patent Grants” patent applications are taken from its USPTO’s
Annual Reports; (2) the number of “Granted U.S. Patents with Blockchain
Claims” is derived a from a keyword search of granted patent claims from the
USPTO online database using the terms “blockchain” and “bitcoin”
respectively; (3) the number of “Estimated Worldwide Blockchain Patent
Applications” is derived from the European Patent Office’s international
database. See, e.g., Tim Pohlmann, Who are the patent leaders in blockchain?,
IAM (June 12, 2019), https://www.iam-media.com/who-are-patent-leadersblockchain; see also Berndsen, supra note 34. The author notes that this
methodology merely provides a first approximation. These fintech patents
may relate to patented technologies from a variety of fields, e.g., cryptology,
security, encryption, finance, without expressly using these terms. Many are
from USPTO Technology Centers TC 2400 and TC 2800. A “technology
center” is an organizational division of the PTO wherein its assigned
employees all examine patent applications in a similar field of science and
technology. Note to readers, the statistics for the year 2021 are only for
January – June 2021, given the date of this article’s publication.
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considered complete. In the U.S. and most of the world, patent
applications are held in secret and not publicly disclosed for 18 months
of pendency.49 Thus, additional patents on a variety of fintech
technologies may be pending for near-term agency consideration and
final issuance. Nevertheless, the data show an exponential growth in
blockchain patent activity. Most notably, it is that Chinese companies
are increasing their contribution to the overall growth in global patent
activity and are leading in the fintech category with a significant
number of fintech patent applications and grants.50

49

Generally, in the U.S., the average utility patent application pendency
before any final determination as to its grant as a patent may be between 18
and 36 months.
50
Andrea Wechsler, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Indian Patent
Information in Comparison: Asia’s Rising Role in Technology Disclosure
Through the Patent System, 2 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 101, 104 (2009).
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Table 1: Recent USPTO Patent Grants51
Fiscal
Year

U.S.
Utility
Patents
Issued

2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021

207,915
221,350
246,646
265,979
303,930
295,460
304,568
315,367
306,912
336,846
360,784

Recent USPTO Patent Grants
Total
Granted U.S.
Granted
U.S.
Patents with
U.S.
Patents
Blockchain
Patents
Issued
claims
with
Bitcoin
claims
233,127
0
0
244,430
0
0
270,058
0
0
290,083
0
0
329,612
0
2
322,449
0
2
334,107
3
7
347,642
17
16
339,512
82
24
370,423
319
27
399,055
943
24
819
26

Estimated
Worldwide
Blockchain
Patent
Applications
23
23
37
72
226
465
1478
3,768
8,249
2,354
N/A*52

Several factors are driving this accelerated patent pace. Some
may be characterized optimistically and others cynically. Patents are
perceived as benefitting the inventors and the public in a variety of
ways. Patent advocates argue that inventors continue to seek patents
because they advance the goals of, inter alia, securing capital
investment, creating a competitive advantage, and adding to the public
storehouse of knowledge. Others argue that such patents are merely
akin to trophies and serve no legitimate business purpose.53 Legal
scholars argue that this enormous number of patents is simply
irrational because more than 99.9% of patents will never be licensed
or litigated.54 In Patent Portfolios, Professors Parchomovsky and
Wagner conclude that these previously described trends represent a
“patent paradox”:
51

See, e.g., Tim Pohlmann, Who are the patent leaders in blockchain?, IAM
(June 12, 2019), https://www.iam-media.com/who-are-patent-leadersblockchain; see also Berndsen, supra note 34.
52
Since nearly all nations hold pending patent applications in secret for at least 18 months, the most
recent data is not publicly available as of this article’s publication.
53
Seth Fiegerman, In Tech, Patents are Trophies – and These Companies are
Dominating,
CNN
(June
19
,2018),
https://money.cnn.com/2018/06/19/technology/tech-patents/index.html.
54
See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U.
L. REV. 1495 (2001).

2022]

THE CURIOUS CRYPTO QUESTION

15

It is abundantly clear that firms act as though patents
are important
. . . [f]iling patterns and firms’ attitudes toward patents
have presented theorists with a puzzle: if patents are
valuable, where does their value lie?55
In 1973, two commentators made the following cynical
observation about the patent system of a generation ago:
Do the officials of the Patent Office really care about
the validity of the patents which are issued from their
agency, as long as the production goals which they set
for the patent examiners concerning the disposal of
patent applications are met? The official position of the
Patent Office is that they desire the issuance of patents
of the highest possible validity. But, in view of their
actual conduct concerning production goals, this
position must be viewed as at least open to question. As
long as the officials of the Patent Office demand greater
production of disposal each year . . . it is difficult indeed
for anyone with an objective viewpoint to be convinced
that they are paying anything more than lip service to
the concept of the highest possible patent validity.56
As noted, the USPTO is on pace to issue about one million
patents every three years.57 This astonishing output is rooted in the
continuous increase in applicants from domestic applicants, the soaring
increase in foreign applications, and the overall easing of legal
standards around patent eligibility. Further, one must assume that the
business community is validating the principle that a patent confers an
55
Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 5 (2005).
56
Martin R. Horn & Saul Epstein, The Federal Courts’ View of Patents—A
Different View, 55 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y. 134, 134 (1973).
57
See Patents Through History, supra note 44.
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economic benefit, either offensively against a party, to raise venture
capital, or merely defensively to ward off litigation.
Based on current trends, we can conclude that the volume and
pace of fintech-related patents that relate to fintech, for example,
blockchain and crypto technologies, will only continue, if not increase,
over time. More is more. In recent years, the USPTO has granted a
record number of patents across all sectors of technology.58 This
growth in patent activity may be attributed to influencing factors,
including the evolving legal standards governing patentability, the
USPTO’s interpretation of these legal standards in its examination, and
perhaps even the industry’s increased demand due to its own irrational
behavior.59
II.

TREND TWO: THE U.S. PATENT OFFICE’S RECENT
EXAMINATION GUIDANCE WAS A BOON TO FINTECHRELATED PATENTED INVENTIONS

The legal standards surrounding the scope of patentable subject
matter eligibility (SME) — namely, what precisely can be patented in
this country—have evolved due to recent Supreme Court
interpretations of the statutory framework. The Patent Act (35 U.S.C.
§ 101 et seq.) provides the fundamental framework for U.S. patent law,
including the parameters of patent-eligible subject matter. Section 101
of the Patent Act provides the fundamental, independent categories of
patent-eligible subject matter (SME).60 Legal scholars note that these
categories and the provision’s text can be traced back to the founding
of the republic and the first Patent Act of 1790.61 Section 101 of Patent
Act simply states:
58
Table of Issue Years and Patent Numbers, for Selected Document Types
Issued
Since
1836,
U.S.
PAT.
TRADEMARK
OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/issuyear.htm (last visited
Sept. 3, 2021).
59
See e.g., Andrew Toole & Nicholas A. Pairolero, et al. Adjusting to Alice
USPTO patent examination outcomes after Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
International, USPTO Office of the Chief Economist, IP Data Highlights No.
3
(Apr.
2020),
available
at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/OCEDH_AdjustingtoAlice.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2021).
60
The USPTO maintains a web page summarizing its policy and interpretation
of § 101. See Subject matter eligibility, U.S. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/patents/laws/examination-policy/subject-mattereligibility?MURL=PatentEligibility (last visited July 16, 2021). Readers
should be advised that subject matter eligibility is only but one of the factors
under the statute. The Patent Act also provides other requirements for a patent,
including novelty (§ 102), non-obviousness (§ 103), and more. For this
Article’s discussion and purposes, these criteria are less important for the
principal analysis.
61
Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1970).
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Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title.62
Legal observers explain that the operative, overarching theory
behind patentable subject matter is that Congress intended the section
to be interpreted broadly, tempered by the other statutory requirements
of the Act.63 Advocates often invoke Congress’s guidance, which
alleges that one can patent “anything under the sun that is made by
man.”64
In practice, the legacy of these four statutory categories is
anything but simple. Every generation seems to grapple with the nature
and types of inventions properly constituting patent-eligible subject
matter, whether the proposed eligible subject matter was software,65
surgical methods,66 or genetically modified organisms,67 to name just
a few. In this article’s context, the legal issues center on whether the
statute’s grant of patent subject matter eligibility to a “process”
provides the basis for the protection of various methods for finance,
economic activity, and commerce relying on technology. Here the past
is prologue, and the current legal debate on this question is as
complicated as ever.
The legal jurisprudence pertaining to patent-eligible subject
matter (Section 101) fills tomes. The legal analysis goes well beyond
the plain meaning of the words of the statute. A heavy judicial gloss
62

Act of Jul. 19, 1952, 66 Stat. 797.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
64
The Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Patent Act. S. Rep. No
1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H.R. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.,
6 (1952); S. Rep. 1979, at 5; H. R. Rep. 1923, at 6 (“A person may have
‘invented’ a machine or a manufacture, which may include anything under the
sun that is made by man, but it is not necessarily patentable under section 101
unless the conditions of [this] title are fulfilled.”).
65
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (upholding the patentability of certain
processes through articulating a new judicial analysis framework).
66
See Chris J. Katopis, Patents v. Patients?: Recent Policy Implications of
Recent Patent Legislation, 71 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 329 (1997) (discussing,
Pallin v. Singer, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1050 (1995)).
67
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (upholding the patentability
of genetically modified organisms).
63
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has animated the meaning of this section. For the fintech world, three
recent U.S. federal court opinions have had a significant impact on the
jurisprudence surrounding Section 101.68
In Section 101 jurisprudence, the federal courts have
acknowledged, if not wholly judicially created, a number of judicial
exceptions to patentable subject matter, such as a prohibition on the
patenting of laws of nature (e.g., E=mc2).69 In the landmark 1980’s
opinion Diamond v. Diehr, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed three
categories of subject matter that are unpatentable, namely “laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”70 In upholding the
patentability of a process incorporating a mathematical formula, the
Court wrote:
[A] new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant
found in the wild is not patentable subject matter.
Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law
that E = mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law
of gravity. Such discoveries are “manifestations of . . .
nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to
none.”71
In making this distinction between the protection of pure and
applied scientific and mathematical principles, the Supreme Court
ruling validated a fundamental concept still quite applicable to fintech
today. Namely, many fintech and intangible process/method
inventions are implicated as they inevitably incorporate a
mathematical formula as a fundamental element of their invention. A
recurring theme for the Supreme Court’s patent jurisprudence is
defending the public “storehouse of knowledge” and avoiding the
private preemption of that knowledge.72 For the Supreme Court, it is
68

In the current discussion of the Supreme Court §101 process/method
jurisprudence, a third case is also frequently mentioned. This third case
concerns issues in the life sciences sector. Hence, for the purposes of this
Article, it is not relevant for the fintech sector issues. Mayo Collaborative
Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012) (holding that the
process to determine the dosage of naturally occurring drug metabolites is
ineligible patentable subject matter pursuant to § 101).
69
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
70
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (upholding the patentability
of a process that as a whole incorporates a mathematical formula).
71
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v.
Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
72
While the judicially crafted exceptions are beyond the plain text of the
statute, the Court has observed that they are “part of the storehouse of
knowledge of all men . . . free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”
Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 130.
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not permissible to confer a patent monopoly based merely on an
algorithm or a fundamental form of human economic business activity.
Notably, the fundamental technology underlying many fintech ledger
technologies is math and data (e.g., the encryption’s computation of
hash of a certain bit length). Opponents argue that more is necessary
before invoking patent protection. The federal courts have struggled to
draw an appropriate line. While some legal questions around
patentability have been settled for decades, many of the Supreme
Court’s latest Section 101 opinions have proven surprising and
disruptive to the regular order.
Many legal observers and industry insiders believed for
decades that the courts had relied upon a judicially crafted73 business
method exemption to patent subject matter eligibility. In 1999, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit expressly rejected that
principle. In State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial
Group, Inc., the court held that patents directed at methods of doing
business were indeed patent-eligible subject matter.74 The Federal
Circuit’s reasoning was based on a broad interpretation of the Patent
Act’s Section 101 and its application of the judicially crafted test
considering a claimed process’s “useful, concrete, and tangible
result.”75 State Street’s controversial opinion instantly became
notorious and launched a public hue and cry that raged for nearly two
decades.
Q. Todd Dickinson, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce and
the head of the USPTO during the Clinton administration, was
responsible for the agency’s patent examination policy during the
intense debate over the State Street opinion. He was an ardent
supporter of patents on methods and processes covering a broad
spectrum of eligibility, including business and commercial activity.
Dickinson had testified before congressional hearings and written
extensively in the defense of business-related patents, including the
following remarks:

73

In this context, “judicially crafted” means a statutory construction,
analytical framework, or judge made law outside the plain text of the Patent
Act.
74
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (The court upheld the patentability of U.S. Patent No.
5,193,056, entitled “Data Processing System for Hub and Spoke Financial
Services Configuration.”).
75
Id.
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The private sector looks for financial returns on its
research investment, whereas [the U.S. Government]
does not. Of course, the financial returns are very often
packaged as, or linked to, intellectual property rights.
Thus the increasing role of private funding in R&D has
meant an increasing role for the intellectual property
system. . . . As companies have come to realize that
increasing value rests on knowledge, they have,
naturally enough, pushed to convert that value into
assets. One way–perhaps the principal way–that
conversion occurs is through intellectual property
rights. . . . In 1999, in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Financial Group, Inc., the federal courts
validated the PTO analysis in those guidelines. The
court also rejected the so-called “business method
exception,” stating that inventions of this nature may be
invalid on other grounds, such as lack of novelty or
obviousness, but not because they were improper
subject matter.76
In the ensuing years, the agency’s examination policy resulted
in the grant of thousands of business method patents.77 Hence, many
of these business method patents were asserted against parties and
litigated in the federal courts; while others were used as a basis to
establish and finance fintech companies.
The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately considered a variety of
these subject matter eligibility issues in a trio of cases. In 2010, in
Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court considered the patentability of a
rejected application for a method of hedging economic risk.78
However, the Court spoke to a much greater question about the scope
of patentability. The Court upheld the lower court’s invalidation of the
76

The Hon. Q. Todd Dickinson, Reconciling Research and the Patent System,
16 ISSUES IN SCI. AND TECH. 4 (Summer 2000), available at
https://issues.org/dickinson/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2021).
77
Ann M. Rizzo, The Aftermath of State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature
Financial
Group: Effects of United States Electronic Commerce Business Method
Patentability on International Legal and Economic Systems, 50 DEPAUL L.
REV. 313 (2000) (“the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has
witnessed a 70 percent increase in business method patents since the Federal
Circuit decided State Street Bank v. Signature Financial Group (State Street
II) in early 1999”).
78
The patent-application-in-suit was rejected at multiple stages of the process.
U.S. Patent Application No. 08/833,892. The process patent application was
“for a claimed invention that explains how buyers and sellers of commodities
in the energy market can protect, or hedge, against the risk of price changes.”
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business method patent-application-in-suit.79 In retrospect, some may
regard this litigated method as a very trivial type of a patented process.
More significantly, in Bilski, the Court’s 9-0 opinion expressly rejected
the long-standing “machine-or-transformation test” as the judiciary’s
sole test of a process’s patentability under Section 101.80 Significantly,
the Court also preserved business method patents as a viable category
of patent-eligible subject matter.81 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion
preserved the category of business method patents at large based on its
statutory construction of the Patent Act.82 The Court observed, inter
alia, that “Congress took this permissive approach to patent eligibility
to ensure that ‘ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement.’”83
In the 2014 case Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, the
U.S. Supreme Court further considered the scope of patent-eligible
inventions.84 Here, the Court essentially narrowed the scope of the
patentability of process/method patents, though they were still
preserved as a class.85 The Supreme Court rejected the lower court’s
SME analytical framework, rather opting for a two-part patentability
analysis.86 The Alice two-prong analysis for a claimed patented process
first considers whether the claim contains an “abstract idea”; and
second, whether the said claim has any sufficient additional elements
providing an “inventive concept” thus transforming it into the requisite
patentable eligible subject matter.87
Alice’s jurisprudence and its new, more restrictive patent
eligibility standards were a welcome relief for many in the financial
services and software industries.88 In contrast, Alice was poorly
received in some quarters, with some legal practitioners arguing that
79

Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 613 (2010).
Id at 604.
81
Id. at 607–08.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 601 (quoting 5 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 75–76 (H. Washington
ed. 1871)).
84
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
85
Id. at 226.
86
Id. at 217.
87
Id. at 218–21, (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012)).
88
See generally Michael Rosen, Patent owners breathing slightly easier as
‘Alice’
noose
loosens
further,
AEIDEAS
BLOG,
https://www.aei.org/technology-and-innovation/intellectual-property/patentowners-breathing-slightly-easier-as-alice-noose-loosens-further/ (last visited
Sept. 25, 2021).
80
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the resulting two-prong test was confusing and unpredictable.89
Nevertheless, as a result, the business of business method patents saw
a sea change. In practice, it became extraordinarily difficult to obtain
patent protection on such claimed method and process type inventions,
and the USPTO’s allowance rate percentage for such inventions
declined into the single digits.
In response to the Bilski-Alice-Mayo Supreme Court opinions
about subject-matter eligibility, the USPTO in 2019 issued new patent
examination guidance (“PEG”) to its corps of 8,000-plus patent
examiners.90 The new agency PEG guidance arguably tracked the Alice
analytical framework and mandated its patent examiners to apply
Alice’s two-part analysis (i.e., prong one considered whether the
application claim presented an abstract idea, while prong two
considered whether the application recited redeeming “inventive
concept” elements).91 The resulting changes in examination policy
were striking because they substantially increased allowance rates for
such types of intangible inventions. Certainly, the run-of-the-mill
business method patents92 (i.e., a method for “buying low, selling high”
or paying a bill with cryptocurrency without technologically more)
were still dubious and through additional scrutiny still screened out as
invalid. Upon review of the evidence and results, one can conclude that
the PEG guidance resulted in increasing the coarseness of the agency’s
examination filter and yielding a corresponding increase in
patentability across many fields, including fintech.
In 2020, the USPTO’s Office of the Chief Economist assessed
the impact of the agency’s recently revised patent examination
guidance (“PEG”).93 It issued a report that confirmed what many in the
tech industry had suspected, if not simply outright feared. The USPTO
89
Ping-Hsun Chen, Patent-Eligibility Standard for Network Architecture
Patents Under the Federal Circuit’s Jurisprudence, 36 SANTA CLARA HIGH
TECH. L.J. 1, 6 (2019)
(“The Alice standard has been criticized by some commentators because of
its confusion and vagueness. For example, one commentator observes that the
Federal Circuit has struggled in defining the scope of abstract ideas and
questions if the Federal Circuit has turned step two analysis into a novelty test
by focusing on whether claim elements are conventional.”).
90
See Adjusting to Alice USPTO patent examination outcomes after Alice
Corp. v.
CLS Bank International report of the USPTO, U.S. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF.
(Apr. 2020), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/OCEDH_AdjustingtoAlice.pdf (“This report focuses on two USPTO patent
examination outcomes and evaluates how these outcomes changed in
response to the Alice decision.”) (hereinafter Adjusting to Alice).
91
See generally Alice Corp., supra note 84.
92
Business methods are reviewed by section 705 of the USPTO examination
corps.
93
See Adjusting to Alice, supra note 90.
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was able to dramatically increase the allowance rate of intangible
inventions through its new examination policies, which debatably
correctly tracked the recent Supreme Court patent SME
jurisprudence.94
In its findings, the USPTO argued that “[t]he evidence suggests
that the 2019 PEG provided clarity and structure to the decisionmaking process.”95 The report further illustrated the effect of the new
examination guidance in reducing the probability of a given patent
receiving a Section 101 rejection.96
Chart 4: USPTO Adjusting to Alice Report97

In practice, reducing the probability of any given basis for
rejection suggests an increase in the allowance of an application. This
result is consistent with the overall data reported by the article above.
For fintech, the implications of the agency PEG guidance and
94

See generally Britain Eakin, Iancu Touts Patent Eligibility Guidance That
Just
‘Works’,
LAW360
(Sept.
25,
2021)
https://www.law360.com/articles/1202980 (last visited Sept. 25, 2021).
95
Adjusting to Alice, supra note 90, at 7.
96
Note that while the probability of a Section 101 rejection decreased, a given
patent could still be finally rejected for another defect (e.g., lacking novelty
(Section 102), non-obviousness (Section 103), etc.).
97
Adjusting to Alice, supra note 56, at 5.
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procedures must be studied more closely. Given the 2019 PEG
guidance, the allowance rate for the run-of-the-mill, pure business
method patent category (Class 705) is still quite low. Notably, in
contrast, the allowance rate for patents on more complicated elements
in fintech and crypto, such as on the security aspects of a system or the
database ledger, are alleged to have tripled, rising from 10% to 30%
across various technology centers, including 2400 (ledger aspects) and
2800 (databases).98 Looking ahead, it is unclear whether this
examination guidance will remain in effect in the future.
Congressional leaders heeded the hue-and-cry from
stakeholders and the public about the alleged uncertainty and
confusion surrounding the state of patent-eligible subject matter
(Section 101). During the 116th session of Congress (2019–2020), the
U.S. Senate Judiciary Intellectual Property Subcommittee held three
days of hearings that featured more than 45 witnesses.99 Lawmakers
circulated and discussed proposed draft patent SME Section 101,
which was legislation intended to clarify, if not to ease, eligibility.
Ultimately, these efforts yielded no legislative action. Today, legal
observers are pessimistic that Congress will enact any reforms
concerning the eligibility question anytime in the near future.100
Accordingly, the federal courts will continue to be the main source of
interpretation and guidance concerning these patentability issues.
In sum, the shifting legal standards around the once bedrock
principle of patent subject matter eligibility (Section 101) has had a
material impact on fintech patents and arguably industry innovation.
This history emphasizes the government’s powerful role in securing
patent rights on fintech innovation, and hence, likely securing the
corresponding underlying investment in this field. The shifting
standards have modulated both patent applications and allowances in
the field, not unlike the turning of a radio with a dial. In the face of the
perceived threat of this increased patent activity, the finance and
98

Phone interviews with UPSTO examiners on file with the author.
See Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Intellectual Property 116th
Congressional Report, IPWATCHDOG, (last visited July 16, 2021); see also
Eileen McDermott, Final Panelists at Senate 101 Hearings Stress Real-World
Effects of Status Quo, Tillis Signals Changes to Draft Text, IPWATCHDOG
(June 11, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/06/11/final-panelistssenate-101-hearing-stress-real-world-effects-status-quo-tillis-signalschanges-draft-text/id=110297/.
100
Eileen McDermott, USPTO Delivers on Senators’ Request for Patent
Eligibility Jurisprudence Study, IPWATCHDOG (July 8, 2021),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2021/07/08/uspto-delivers-senators-requestpatent-eligibility-jurisprudence-study/id=135339/ (“[O]ne of the authors of
the March letter, Senator Thom Tillis (R-NC), led the charge in 2019 trying
to reach agreement on reforms to Section 101/ patent eligibility law,
ultimately declaring it ‘dead on arrival’ without stakeholder consensus.”).
99
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technology industries have advocated lawmakers and regulators
pursue a variety of remedial safeguards.
III.

TREND THREE: THE FEDERAL COURTS STRENGTHENED
SAFEGUARDS AGAINST POOR PATENT QUALITY

In response to almost a decade of intensive industry lobbying,
the U.S. Congress enacted a sweeping reform of the patent law—the
most significant change since the 1952 Patent Act.101 In 2011,
Congress enacted the America Invents Act (AIA) which added a
number of sweeping statutory reforms to the patent system.102 One
significant reform established a number of procedures within the
USPTO for reconsidering poor-quality or weak patents that were
previously issued and potentially subject to some type of federal court
litigation challenge.103 The goal was to establish an administrative
alternative to costly, lengthy, and burdensome court litigation.104 The
AIA established the following procedures within the USPTO’s Patent
Trial and Appeal Board, each having different criteria for
reconsidering the validity of an issued patent: (1) inter partes review
(“IPR”), (2) post-grant review opposition (“PGR”), and (3) the
Transitional Program for Covered Business Methods (CBM).105
These three PTAB mechanisms continue to prove significant
in many ways. The procedures have proven even more popular and
effective than predicted, such that their use has far exceeded the
anticipated demand. Since the AIA’s enactment, more than 14,000
such administrative cases have been brought to review patent
validity.106 It has been widely reported that approximately 85% of
patents were invalidated through these cases.107 These procedures have
also proven very unpopular with certain stakeholders, especially patent
101

Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 1 et seq. (1952)).
102
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat (2011).
103
See America Invents Act, H. Report No. REPT. 112–98 (June 1, 2012)
https://www.congress.gov/112/crpt/hrpt98/CRPT-112hrpt98.pdf (last visited
Sept. 25, 2021).
104
Id. at 48 (The AIA legislative report explains that new post-grant review
proceedings to review patents with “the purpose of the section as providing
quick and cost effective alternatives to litigation.”).
105
Patent Act of 1952, supra note 103, at § 18 (Note that the AIA also contains
several other reforms, such as provisions directed at a category of patents for
tax avoidance strategies.).
106
See Statistics, U.S. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF., (Feb. 14, 2021, 8:27 AM),
https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/statistics.
107
Id.
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owners seeing who have seen their patents struck down. Accordingly,
a number of legal suits have been brought, challenging the AIA’s
procedures and legal regime. Many of these anti-AIA legal challenges
have failed.108 The federal courts have provided guidance that, in many
ways, has further strengthened the proceedings and its ability to
invalidate challenged patent claims.
Two arguably conflicting trends are emerging. First, the
USPTO, the gatekeeper agency, is more generous toward those seeking
patents. It continues to reevaluate and ease its patentability standards
and accelerate the pace of patenting activity. Second, the USPTO’s
mechanisms for invalidating poor-quality patent claims across all
technology fields have been strengthened through recent federal court
rulings. Accordingly, it appears that the government giveth with one
hand and taketh away with the other. Observers conclude that despite
the continued existence of patents on esoteric, intangible inventions
(e.g., underlying blockchain ledger elements), the patent system is
evolving toward a different cohort of patents with higher-quality
claims.109
The following are two recent federal cases of note because they
strengthen the existing agency procedures and mechanisms to
invalidate patents:
Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Technologies, LP: In 2020,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that key Patent Act AIA
trial procedures (35 U.S.C. § 314(d)) were precluded
from judicial review.110 It foreclosed judicial review of
the USPTO PTAB institution decision pursuant to the
agency’s determination of the statutory one-year time
bar. While petitioners challenging a patent by filing an
inter partes review (IPR) petition must do so within the
statutory time frame, the resulting USPTO’s institution
decision cannot be subsequently challenged in federal
court. In turn, this administrative mechanism provides
those petitioning the USPTO seeking to invalidate
patents additional safeguards toward the institution
process. In construing these Patent Act AIA provisions,
the Court explained that this furthers the goal of the
108

See, e.g., Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC,
138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018) (upholding the constitutionality of the AIA PTAB
post-grant validity review procedures).
109
See, e.g., Sasha Moss et al., Inter Partes Review As A Means To Improve
Patent Quality, 46 R STREET SHORTS 1 (Sept. 2017),
https://www.rstreet.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/09/RSTREETSHORT46.pdf (last visited Sept. 25,
2021).
110
Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Technologies, LP, 140 S. Ct. 1367 (2020).
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statute, which is “to weed out bad patent claims
efficiently,” not “to save bad patent claims” through
procedural technicalities.111
Security People, Inc. v. Iancu: In 2020, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that a
constitutional challenge to an IPR final written decision
is subject to judicial review only by appeal to the
Federal Circuit, not by collateral attack in district court
under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).112
These two court opinions strengthened the Patent Act’s AIA
trials as an important tool to check patent quality and invalidate poorquality patents across all sectors, including fintech and blockchain. In
contrast, some critics argue that while these court rulings may serve as
a generalized improvement for the innovation ecosystem against the
most egregious patents, the fintech industry may still be plagued by a
wide variety of poor-quality patents and specious patent litigation.113
Other critics argue that such procedures chill innovation as the patent
system seems absurd and futile in the end.114 It is likely that we will
see a robust public policy debate over additional congressional reforms
to the Patent Act (such as the reinstatement of the now-expired CBM
program), the USPTO’s internal rulemaking pertaining to examination
guidelines, and its PTAB procedures. Any such reforms may be years
in the making. In the alternative, it is telling that the fintech industry is
also looking to a variety of private sector, industry-based legal
defensive mechanisms.

111

Id. at 1374.
Security People, Inc. v. Iancu, 971 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
113
See Eileen McDermott, Special Interest Group Implores Congress to
Extend
CBM
Program,
IPWATCHDOG
(Sept.
3,
2020),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/09/03/special-interest-group-implorescongress-extend-cbm-program/id=124863/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2021).
114
See letter of IEEE-USA to Sens. Tillis and Coons, IEEE-USA (July 14,
2020),
https://ieeeusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/071420.pdf
(“Protections for technologies from artificial intelligence to DRM to
blockchain or to cybersecurity— which are implemented through software—
are put at greater risk because of the CBM Program.”).
112
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TREND FOUR: PRIVATE SECTOR CONTINUED TO ORGANIZE TO
FORM LITIGATION DEFENSIVE MECHANISMS

In response to the continuing threat of costly patent litigation,
the fintech industry has organized several private sector organizations
to ward off specious patent legal challenges. Patent litigation is
notoriously expensive to defend.115 Legal costs often climb into the
high six figures, if not into the millions.116 Observer’s label patent
litigation as a “bet the company” event and that it poses an existential
threat.117
A variety of novel organizations have emerged to help the
fintech industry:
The LOT Network: The License on Transfer (“LOT”) Network
is a nonprofit organization formed in 2014 to defend high-tech
companies across a number of technology sectors from patent
litigation threats.118 The LOT Network website boasts that they
“prevent unwanted litigation while preserving the use of your
patents. Join the community of 1600+ global industry leaders
who have collaboratively immunized themselves against
lawsuits from Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs, also known as
‘patent trolls’).”119 Its founding members include a several tech
companies.120 Its 1,100-plus membership includes a number of
115

See generally Intellectual Property: Assessing Factors That Affect Patent
Infringement Litigation Could Help Improve Patent Quality, GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. (Aug. 2013), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-13465.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2021).
116
Id. at 25 n.47 (“For the 18 percent of those lawyers that responded, AIPLA
reports that the median legal cost for one patent infringement lawsuit was
$650,000 when less than $1 million was at risk for damages; $2.5 million
when between $1 million and $25 million was at risk for damages; and $5
million when more than $25 million was at risk for damages. These costs
include legal fees and exclude damage awards.”).
117
See, e.g., Improving Federal Court Adjudication of Patent Cases Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, The Internet, and Intellectual Prop., 109
Cong. 59 (2005) (statement of Chris J. Katopis); Yury Kapgan & Kathy Yu,
Betting the company: the bottom line in patent litigation, DAILY J. (Jan. 3,
2012)
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/keys-to-patent-litigationstrategy (“For many businesses, patent lawsuits can be ‘bet the company’ type
of litigation.”).
118
Ken Seddon, Invest in Growth How LOT Network Addresses the PAE
Problem, LOTNETWORK (Nov. 2, 2016) https://lotnet.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/12/Introduction-of-LOT-2.0.1.pdf (last visited Sept.
25, 2021).
119
See LOTNETWORK, https://lotnet.com/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2021).
120
See LOT Network Achieves Significant Membership Milestone – 1,000
Members and Counting, LOTNETWORK (Oct. 28, 2020),
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leading innovative companies that secure fintech patents,
including IBM, Square, and Visa.121
Unified Patents: Unified Patents is a private company
that helps member companies defend against patent
litigation by offering a suite of services based on either
a free or paid membership.122 In turn, it offers a range
of services, such as analytical data, legal services, and
lobbying.123
COPA: In 2020, under Jack Dorsey’s leadership,
Square, Inc. organized, the Crypto Open Patent
Alliance (“COPA”).124 The goal is for the member
fintech companies to place their crypto patents in a
shared library to help ward off aggressive patent
assertions in court by so-called non-practicing entities
(NPEs) or patent trolls.125
The emergence of such industry defensive organizations is
quite telling. While companies invest millions into fintech innovation
research and development and in the pursuit of patent protection, they
are also seriously concerned about potential patent infringement
liability and are making a concerted effort to ward off such problematic
litigation. While industry players may keenly desire various aspects of
patent reform, these organizations are an acknowledgment that any
type of regulatory relief and litigation reform may be difficult to
achieve and remains politically challenging and a long way off.

https://lotnet.com/lot-network-achieves-significant-membership-milestone1000-members-and-counting/.
121
Why Join Lot?, LOTNETWORK, https://lotnet.com/why-join-lot/ (last
visited Jan. 31, 2021).
122
JOIN, UNIFIED PAT., https://www.unifiedpatents.com/join (last visited
Sept. 25, 2021).
123
Id.
124
Adrian Zmudzinski, Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey launches Crypto Open
Patent
Alliance,
MODERNCONSENUS
(Sept.
11,
2021),
https://modernconsensus.com/cryptocurrencies/twitter-ceo-jack-dorseylaunches-crypto-open-patent-alliance/.
125
See, e.g., Paddy Baker, Square Forms Group to Stop Patent Hoarding from
Stifling Crypto Innovation, COINDESK (Sept. 10, 2020, 9:43 AM),
https://www.coindesk.com/square-alliance-patents-crypto.
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TREND FIVE: THE EMPIRICAL DATA SUGGESTS THAT
UNCERTAINTY IN THE VALUE OF FINTECH PATENTS

It is notoriously difficult to value an intellectual property asset,
especially for cutting-edge patented technologies, (e.g., since they may
not have secured an established market).126 A variety of methodologies
may be employed based on a wide range of factors (e.g., an economic
analysis utilizing an expected return on investment, the aggregate
value of the future licensing royalty stream, etc.). Patents reflect a
proxy on innovation and are, often a result of millions of R&D
spending and capital investment. An old adage among patent attorneys
is that a patent is only worth as much as the resulting monetary
damages arising from a patent infringement lawsuit. In essence, patent
litigation is a proxy for economic value. The establishment of the
USPTO PTAB AIA post-grant validity trials was a direct response to
costly and burdensome patent litigation.127 In an attempt to valuate
fintech patents, the author has reviewed recent USPTO CBM records
to assess the frequency of blockchain or crypto patents involved in
such post-grant disputes.
This article relies on the hypothesis that one can correlate the
economic value of a given innovation, such as those protected by
fintech patents covering blockchain and bitcoin, with the amount of
patent activity. Many legal observers and economists argue that patents
represent investment (e.g., human capital and R&D) secured by the
patent right.128 Notably, many will further correlate a patent’s
economic value with its post-grant patent activity, (e.g., disputes and
litigation).129 The hypothesis supposes that rational behavior dictates
126
See generally Kevin Rivette et al., Discovering New Value in Intellectual
Property,
H.
BUS.
REV.
(Jan.-Feb.
2000),
https://hbr.org/2000/01/discovering-new-value-in-intellectual-property (last
visited Sept. 25, 2021).
127
See 35 U.S.C. § 1 (2018); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No.
112–29; 125 Stat. 284 (2011) H.R. REP. NO. 112–98 (2011).
128
See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 55, at 18 (2005) (“Given
that virtually all the corporations that engage in intensive patenting operate in
highly competitive industries, and that many of them are Fortune 500
companies, it is highly unlikely that such irrational behavior could persist for
so many years without grave economic consequences . . . this is not borne out
by reality . . . “in discussing patents as internal metrics of an entity’s
performance, innovation, R&D, or individual employee’s productivity.”); see
also Frederic M. Scherer, INNOVATION AND GROWTH: SCHUMPETERIAN
PERSPECTIVES 3–7 (1984) (describing phases of investment in development
of inventions).
129
See Alan C. Marco, The Option Value of Patent Litigation: Theory and
Evidence, 2 (Vassar Coll. Econ., Working Paper # 52, 2003),
https://www.vassar.edu/economics/docs/working-papers/VCEWP52.pdf
(last visiting Aug. 1, 2021); John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemly, Kimberly A.
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that when a patent has economic value, it is often the subject of some
type of commerce and inevitably legal activity (e.g., infringement
litigation) concerning the disputed infringing commercial activity.
Parties use the USPTO’s PTAB forum, in turn, to litigate issues
pertaining to a patent controversy. Arguably, Congress established the
CBM forum with the express purpose of reducing the frequency and
cost of litigation in the financial services industry and patent litigation,
including business method patent (BMP) litigation.130 This universe
theoretically includes fintech technologies, including those that have a
blockchain or crypto component. Further, one may also consider the
creation of the industry sector defensive organizations described above
(i.e., the LOT Network and COPA) as evidence that the fintech
industry still considers patent litigation as inevitable, expensive,
vexing, troublesome, and often specious.
A search of the USPTO PTAB records yielded some surprising
131
results. First, no “blockchain” patents have been the subject of AIA
adversarial disputes to date, including the CBM program.132 Second,
the CBM program was used quite modestly compared with other
Moore et. al., ARTICLE: Valuable Patents, 92 GEO L.J. 435, 437 (2004) (“We
conclude that the easiest way to discover the characteristics of valuable
patents is to study litigated patents.”). Id. at 437; see also John R. Allison &
Thomas W. Sager, Valuable Patents Redux: On the Enduring Merit of Using
Patent Characteristics to Identify Valuable Patents, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1769
(2007) (a key factor in the patent value (or worth) analysis for Allison et al. is
estimating the probability that a patent is litigated.).
130
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reviewed the USPTO
CBM program and concluded the following: “Stakeholders we interviewed
generally agreed that the CBM program has reduced litigation, and many said
there is value in maintaining some aspects of the program. Stakeholders
generally agreed that the CBM program has contributed to a decrease in
litigation involving business methods patents and that the program has had
positive effects on innovation and investment.” U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office: Assessment of the Covered Business Method Patent Review Program,
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. 34 (Mar. 12, 2018),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-18-320.pdf .
131
The USPTO PTAB maintains a publicly accessible case decision database.
See
Board
Decisions,
U.S.
PAT.
TRADEMARK
OFF.,
https://developer.uspto.gov/ptab-web/#/search/decisions (last visited July 14,
2021).
132
Querying Results from Keyword Text Search of “Blockchain” and
“Bitcoin” within the Decision Search Bar, USPTO PATENT TRIAL AND
APPEAL BOARD DECISION DATABASE, https://developer.uspto.gov/ptabweb/#/search/decisions.
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PTAB trials (i.e., only about 500 actions during the program’s sevenyear existence) and compared with 14,000-plus AIA trials. Again,
there were no blockchain-related patents in these disputes. More
surprisingly, virtually no blockchain or cryptocurrency patents were
subject to this post-grant federal agency review.133 To date, one can
conclude that these species of fintech patents have neither developed
significant economic market value in themselves nor have they been
the subject of significant federal litigation disputes.134
There are numerous alternative possibilities that explain why
fintech patents covering blockchain and crypto-related technologies do
not arise in these proceedings. There may be possible reasons
including: (1) other patent quality safeguards have weeded out poorquality or otherwise weak patent claims before grant or before they
posed a threat;135 (2) the current PTAB procedures only provided
limited bases for disputing poor-quality patents; (3) the existence of
procedural defects in the PTAB rules and procedures prohibit a
defendant’s participation; (4) effective marketplace licensing regimes
are in place; (5) private sector litigation defensive organizations are
effective; (6) fintech platforms—especially in the cryptocurrency
space—are open source; and (7) some patents are simply litigated later
in their lifetime (again, many of these patents were only granted in the
past five years). Further, any such patent cases may have merely been
settled by the parties outside the dispute forums. The settlement terms
may have included economic damages and/or the cross-licensing of
technologies among parties.
For interested readers, this article includes an appendix
summarizing the recent CBM cases during 2020, including the case
number, the disputed patent, and the party litigant information. The
CBM review process has expired pursuant to the AIA’s statutory
sunset provision.136 Legislators were correct in developing a
transitional pilot program to address the legitimate patent quality and
133

Id.
Additionally, a search of the USPTO PTAB database of ex parte appeal
reviews of such patent applications find the agency has merely considered 17
blockchain applications, with the outcome that some examiner rejection was
affirmed, as of this Article’s publication. See Board Decisions, supra note
136.
135
Board Decisions, supra note 136 (regarding the ex parte review).
136
It is notable that legal observers concluded that upon a statistical analysis
of the CBM program that “the success rate of petitioners steadily declined to
the point that none prevailed in CBMR petitions filed after July 2018 for
which the PTAB rendered a decision.” Ron D. Katznelson, The CBM program
should expire this week as provided by law — Effective alternatives for robust
administrative reviews of issued patents remain, US INVENTOR 6 (Sept. 13,
2020)
https://usinventor.org/wp-content/uploads/Katznelson-on-CBMsunset.pdf.
134
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litigation risk concerns of the financial services industry. Policymakers
and regulators should certainly continue to monitor fintech patent
litigation in the federal courts and PTAB AIA trials, including
evaluating empirical data as presented herein. Patent litigation activity
pertinent to fintech-related technologies can help assess the economic
value of underlying patented technology. Given the accelerating pace
of global patent grant activity, we may simply be living in the fintech
litigation calm before the storm. The author acknowledges that, while
these results are interesting on their face, they are still inconclusive and
demand further study.
CONCLUSION
This article’s fundamental question —Do patents advance
fintech innovation? — may be answered by studying the recent
empirical data regarding fintech patents. The promised blessings of
intellectual property (IP), including those expressed for the patent
protection of fintech, and increasingly, blockchain-based technologies,
are premised on its dual potential to promote innovation and to benefit
the public. A variety of players – ranging from mature banking
institutions, established technology names, speculative investors,
disruptive start-ups – are making significant investments of time,
capital, and other resources to obtain global IP rights at an increasing
pace, as evidenced by the application and grant data for thousands of
blockchain-related patents worldwide annually. The empirical
evidence to date further illustrates the patent paradox described by
many scholars. Data shows that companies are globally investing in
fintech patents at an accelerated pace. In contrast, the evidence also
suggests that the value of and the expected return on these fintech IP
asset investments is presently very unclear. Despite America’s twocentury-plus experience with the patent system, patents still present
curious questions about their utility, especially their ultimate value for
today’s increasingly fintech and crypto-centric world.
While fintech is still in its nascency, its dramatic rise poses
important public policy and legal challenges for policymakers,
regulators, and industry stakeholders. There is a long-standing and
intense debate surrounding the incentives and the societal value of
patents in driving innovation in any industry sector while
simultaneously enhancing the public good. The true utility of fintech
patents may be debated by numerous stakeholders, including
policymakers, regulators, the courts, and the market. A vast amount of
literature argues that historically patents have long secured valuable
rights around innovation and in turn, are a lagging economic indicator
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of incentivized private investment. The wealth of widely available
empirical data is a useful tool for policymakers and regulators. The
empirical data confirms a significant amount of surging activity among
U.S. and global patent trends (e.g., application rates, issuances, and
litigation). The practical reality of the premise’s conclusion may seem
unclear, but certainly worthy of further scrutiny. Ultimately, the
answer to these curious questions about the fintech sector’s ongoing IP
asset obsession may be determined by how disruptive, innovative, and
socially beneficial these patented technologies ultimately prove to be.
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APPENDIX
The following data provides a summary of financial servicesrelated patents disputed in the USPTO Transitional Program for
Covered Business Methods (CBM) during the 2020 calendar year. The
chart provides the patent-in-dispute, the adverse parties, and other
related case information. This sample suggests that litigation
concerning blockchain or crypto-related patents did not arise in within
this program during the period reviewed.
The USPTO CBM program was designed as a temporary
initiative and has been discontinued due to the lapse in statutory
authority.
USPTO PTAB CBM Data for calendar year 2020
Case
Number
CBM 20200001

U.S.
Patent
Number
6,996,538

CBM 20200002

8,429,084

CBM 20200003

9,235,857

CBM 20200004

10,346,840

CBM 20200005

6,996,538

Patent Subject
matter

Patent Owner
(Respondent)

Inventory control
system and methods

Unisone
Strategic IP

Confirming Local
Marketplace
Transaction
Consummation for
Online Payment
Consummation
Confirming Local
Marketplace
Transaction
Consummation for
Online
Confirming Local
Marketplace
Transaction
Consummation for
Online Payment
Consummation
Inventory control
system and methods

Boom!
Payments, Inc.

Defendant
(Petitioner)
Life
Technologies
Corporation
Stripe, Inc.,
Shopify Inc., and
Shopify (USA)
Inc.

Boom!
Payments, Inc.

Stripe, Inc.,
Shopify Inc., and
Shopify (USA)
Inc.

Boom!
Payments, Inc.

Stripe, Inc.,
Shopify Inc., and
Shopify (USA)
Inc.

Unisone
Strategic IP

Life
Technologies
Corp.
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CBM 20200011

7,613,649

CBM 20200012

8,392,311

CBM 20200014

7,736,223

CBM 20200015

8,534,551

CBM 20200020

7,636,687

CBM 20200021

8,392,311

CBM 20200022

7,146,336

CBM 20200023

7,496,534

System and Method
of Implementing
Massive Early
Terminations of
Long Term
Financial
Contracts
System and method
of implementing
massive early
terminations of long
term financial
contracts
A method of and
system for
terminating or
assigning
outstanding OTC
derivative
transactions
between a plurality
of financial
institutions (banks).
Electronic gaming
method and system
having preview
screen
Systems and
methods for sharing
video with
advertisements over
a network
Method and system
for completing a
lease for real
property in an online computing
environment
Currency trading
system, methods,
and software
Currency trading
system, methods,
and software
Methods for trade
decision making
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TriOptima AB

Quantile
Technologies
Limited

TriOptima AB

Quantile
Technologies
Limited

Savvy Dog
Systems, LLC

Banilla Games,
Inc.

Electronic
Receipts
Delivery
systems, LLC

Square, Inc.

Karya Property
Management,
LLC

Resman, LLC

Oanda Corp.

Gain Capital
Holdings, Inc.

Oanda Corp.

Gain Capital
Holdings, Inc.

Oanda Corp.

Gain Capital
Holdings, Inc.
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CBM 20200025

8,571,916

CBM 20200026

9,659,296

CBM 20200027

10,362,341

CBM 20200028

8,825,887

CBM 20202029

10,467,585

Methods, Systems,
and Articles of
Manufacture For
Determining
Optimal Parameter
Settings For
Business Initiative
Testing Models
Method and system
for presenting
representations of
payment accepting
unit events.
Systems and
methods for sharing
video with
advertisements over
a network.
For performing data
processing or other
operations used in
the practice,
administration, or
management of a
financial product or
service.
A method of
optimizing
computerized
inventory orders
over a distributed
network
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Applied
Predictive
Technologies,
Inc.

Marketdial, Inc.

Payrange, Inc.

Kiosoft
Technologies,
LLC,
Techtrex, Inc.

Videoshare,
LLC

Google LLC and
Youtube, LLC

Sito Mobile
R&D IP, LLC
and Sito
Mobile, Ltd.

Hulu, LLC
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